Joanna Banford and Amber Banford v. David Quinley and Kaysville CIty Corp, and Kaysville City Police Department : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
Joanna Banford and Amber Banford v. David
Quinley and Kaysville CIty Corp, and Kaysville
City Police Department : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Harry H. Souvall; Snow; Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Appellees.
Leonard E. McGee; Damian E. Davenport; Lehman; Jensen & Donahue.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Banford v. Quinley, No. 980300 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1961
IN THE UTAH B0URT OF APPEALS tyoJ&o-cA 
JOANNA BANFORD, and AMBER 
BANFORD, a minor, by and through her 
parent and natural guardian, Joanna 
Banford, 
Case No. 980300-CA 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID QUINLEY, an individual and 
KAYSVILLE CITY, CORP., a Utah 
political subdivision, and, KAYSVILLE 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
4k. BRIEF 0 1 APPELLEES 
APPEAL OF FINAL JUDGMENT' 
COURT IN AND FOR DA> 
THE HONORABLE R< 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
)NEY PAGE PRESIDING 
[fajrry H. Souvall 
Ihprneys for Appellees 
Sf PW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
ixchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
ID- Box 45000 
Lake City, Utah 84145 
tilbphone: (801)521-9000 
Leonard E. McGee 
Damian E. Davenport 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C. 
620 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-7858 
FILED 
FEB 0 1 1999 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOANNA BANFORD, and AMBER 
BANFORD, a minor, by and through her 
parent and natural guardian, Joanna Case No. 980300-CA 
Banford, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID QUINLEY, an individual and 
KAYSVILLE CITY, CORP., a Utah 
political subdivision, and, KAYSVILLE 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL OF FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE RODNEY PAGE PRESIDING 
Harry H. Souvall 
Artcmevi for A npellees 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Leonard E. McGee 
Damian E. Davenport 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C. 
620 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone- (801)532-7858 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Course of Proceedings 2 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court 2 
D. Statement of Facts 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROPERLY DRAFT AND 
SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM UPON THE GOVERNING BODY OF 
KAYSVILLE CITY 8 
A. Plaintiffs Must Strictly Comply with the Governmental 
Immunity /\U 10 
B. The Letter of July 12. 1995 Does Not Comply with the Act 11 
C. The Letter of November 16. 1995. Does Not Comply with the Act 12 
D. Actual Knowledge of the Claim by City or Its Insurance Carrier 
Does Not Salvage a Defective Notice of Claim 14 
E. Kaysville and Reliance Insurance Did Not Waive Compliance 
with the Governmental Immunity Act and Are Not Estopped 
to Assert Jurisdiction and Limitations as a Defense 15 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' LAWSUIT IS UNTIMELY 20 
A. Plaintiffs' Claim Was Deemed Denied on February 14, 1996, and 
the Filing of Suit on February 18, 1997 Is Untimely Pursuant to 
IJ.C.A. §63-30-15(2) 20 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Disregarded the Affidavits of Kenneth 
Sondgeroth and His Secretary as Lacking in Foundation and 
Therefore Inadmissible 22 
CONCLUSION 24 
ADDENDUM 
Letter dated July 12, 1995 
Letter dated July 25, 1995 
Letter dated November 16, 1995 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Court's Ruling on Motion to Dismiss 
Findings and Judgment 
u 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
Rellonio v. Salt Lake Citv Corporation. 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1996) . . . 9, 10, 12, 14 
Rischel v. Meritt. 907 P.2d, 275 (Utah App. 1995) 11,19 
Brittainv. State of Utah. 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994) 10 
Rusch v. Salt Lake International Airport. 921 P.2d 470 
(Utah App. 1996) 14, 15 
Debrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995) 1, 20 
Harline v. Rarker. 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996) 1 
Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transportation. 828 P.2d 535 
(Utah App. 1992) 10, 11 
Larson v. Park City Corporation. 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998) 9 
Lister v. Utah Valley Community College. S81 P.2d 933 
(Utah App. 1994) 22, 23 
Lund v. Hall. 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997) 18 
Madsen v. Rorthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) 10 
Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial Commission. 860 P.2d 944 
(Utah App. 1993) 21 
Nielson v. Gurley. 888 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1994) 9, 10 
Rice v. Granite School District. 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969) 17, 18 
Sears v. Southworth. 563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977) 14 
Shunk v. State. 924 P.2d 879 (Utah 1996) 15, 16, 18, 19 
Yates v. Vernal Family Health Ctr.. 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980) 11 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-105 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(2) 7, 12, 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 8, 9, 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 1, 7, 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14 7, 14, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 20, 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15(2) 1, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1 20-22 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-7 21 
Rules and Regulations 
Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1 
Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 21 
Rule 6(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 21 
iv 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendants/Appellees, 
through undersigned counsel, hereby submit the following Appellees' Brief. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant Kaysville City agrees with plaintiffs statement of jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly grant defendants' Motion to Dismiss ruling that 
plaintiffs failed to file a notice of claim with defendant as mandated by Utah Code Annotated 
§63-30-13? 
Orders Granting Motions to Dismiss are reviewed for correctness. Harline v. Barker. 
912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). 
2. Even if plaintiffs properly filed their notice of claim, was their suit filed within 
the time period allowed by Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-15(2)? Legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness. Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). Although not 
decided by the court in its ruling, this court can affirm the trial court's ruling on other 
grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other ground. Debry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 
428, 444 (Utah 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Interpretation of the following statutory provisions are determinative of the issues on 
appeal. The language of these designated statutes are set forth in the addendum to Appellees' 
brief. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Defendants/Appellees agree with Plaintiffs5 Statement regarding the disposition in the 
Trial Court. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Defendants/Appellees agree with Plaintiffs' Statement about the Course of 
Proceedings. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court. 
Defendants/Appellees agree with Plaintiffs' Statement regarding the disposition in the 
Trial Court. 
D. Statement of Facts. 
1. Plaintiff Joanna Banford was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident on 
February 18, 1995 in Davis County. Plaintiff Amber Banford was a passenger in the vehicle. 
(R. 2, Complaint If 7). 
2. The second vehicle in the collision was being driven by David Quinley, a 
Kaysville City Police Officer, who was on duty at the time of the collision. (R. 2, Complaint 
118). 
3. Plaintiffs allege that the negligence of Quinley was the proximate cause of 
plaintiffs' injuries. (R. 2-4 , Complaint Ifsl0-17). 
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4. Some time between April and May of 1995, plaintiffs retained the services of 
attorney Kenneth Sondgeroth of Bullhead City, Arizona. Although plaintiffs claim several 
conversations occurred prior to the July 12,1995, the affidavits are largely irrelevant because 
plaintiffs retained the services of an attorney who objected to direct contact between Clay 
Johnson and the Banfords. No settlement agreement was reached. (R. 31-82, pg. 2 }^6). 
5. On July 12, 1995, through attorney Sondgeroth, plaintiffs caused a letter "re: 
personal injury of Joanna Banford and Amber Banford Date of accident: 2-18-95" to be sent 
"to whom it may concern." and the letter was simply addressed to "Kaysville City Corp." 
The letter specifically states: 
We represent Joanna Banford and Amber Banford in their claim for personal 
injuries sustained in the automobile collision of February 18, 1995. David J. 
Quinley was driving a vehicle which you owned that was involved in this 
accident. 
This letter is to request that you contact or office within ten days with the 
name of your insurance carrier, or to advise us of your status of insurance at 
the time of the accident. Please notify your insurance company of this 
accident if you have not already done so. Please have a representative of your 
insurance company contact us as soon as possible but no later than thirty days 
from the date of this letter. This will eliminate the need for us to contact you 
further. 
Thank you for your cooperation and assistance. 
Very truly yours, 
WEISS & SONDGEROTH 
Kenneth Sondgeroth 
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The letter was unsigned. (R. 24) A copy of the letter is attached in Appellees' Addendum. 
6. In response to plaintiffs' letter of July 12,1995, Dean Storey, Finance Director, 
sent a letter to plaintiffs' counsel providing the requested information regarding the names 
and addresses of the City's insurance carrier, City Attorney and Insurance Agent. The letter 
closed by saying "please contact me as the City representative." (R. 26). A copy of the letter 
is attached in Appellees' Addendum. 
7. On or about November 16, 1995, counsel for plaintiffs sent a letter to 
Mr. Storey in response to his letter dated July 25, 1995. This letter is apparently the 
document that plaintiff claim is their notice of claim. It is entitled "\Re: claim- Joanna and 
Amber Banford." It is not entitled "notice of claim." 
In the letter, Sondgeroth states: 
It was with great relief that I received you letter of July 25, 1995. As 
you are aware, my office represents both Joanna and Amber Banford in their 
claims that arose from a vehicle accident with a member of your police force. 
Clearly, as is evident from the police report, the police officer was grossly 
negligent and that my clients were noting but innocent victims. ... 
My purpose in writing you directly is to obtain some help with your 
insurance company. Mr. Clay Stevens has been assigned this case from 
Reliance Insurance Company. Unfortunately, Mr. Stevens has taken an abrupt 
and confrontational attitude toward my clients which has left this office, and 
Ms. Banford, faced with the prospect of filing suit to remove Mr. Stevens from 
this matter. Hopefully, this will not be necessary once you have been made 
aware of Mr. Stevens outrageous and unethical conduct. 
On page two of the letter, attorney Sondgeroth states the following about settlement: 
Mr. Stevens said he would take care of the bills and pay $20,000.00 for 
all of Mrs. Banford/s damages. Mrs. Banford's injuries for her shattered knee 
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are in excess of $750,000. This is substantiated by settlements across the 
nation for injuries that have required bone grafting and permanent 
disablement. Potentially it could be much larger. 
And on page three of the letter, attorney Sondgeroth concludes with: 
Please advise whether you can help my clients gain a better attitude 
from our insurance provider. In sincerely hope that we can work together to 
minimize this conflict and obtain appropriate compensation for the injuries that 
have occurred. This process so far has been quite intolerable. 
This letter was signed. (R. 55-57). This letter is attached to Appellees' Addendum. 
8. No other correspondence was sent by counsel for plaintiffs to any represen-
tative or officer of Kaysville City during the one year period following the accident. (R. 18, 
116). 
9. Plaintiff filed this action on February 18, 1997. (R. 1-4). 
10. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on June 19, 1997. (R. 14-30). 
11. Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition which, among other things, 
contained the affidavits of Kenneth Sondgeroth, Brian Jensen and Joanna Banford detailing 
their conversations with city officials and the adjustor for Reliance Insurance. (R. 49-52). 
12. Defendants moved to strike the affidavits. (R. 84-85). Specifically, defendants 
moved to strike the affidavits of Sondgeroth, Jensen and Banford because: 
1. Affidavit of Kenneth Sondgeroth is objectionable and should 
be stricken for several reasons. His statement that he had several phone 
discussions with Reliance Insurance and that they showed a willingness to 
discuss settlement is irrelevant. The proper service of a notice of claim is 
jurisdictional. The alleged statement by Clay Stevens that their was clear 
liability in the matter and that the only question to be looked at was the 
amount of damages is irrelevant. The statute mandates that the acceptance 
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of a claim be in writing. The claim was not acted upon and was deemed 
denied. Only a written acceptance claim could salvage plaintiffs' efforts to 
turn settlement negotiations into a waiver or estoppel. 
2. Affidavit of Brian Jensen is irrelevant and should be stricken. 
Jensen alleged that he contacted the mayor of Kaysville who ultimately led 
him to contact the insurance company whose representative indicated that 
they would not pay the claim until further documentation was supplied. The 
Jensen affidavit further indicates that the Banfords then obtained counsel. 
This information is irrelevant. The affidavit does not allege that anyone 
from Kaysville misled them into misfiling or failing to serve the notice of 
claim. The affidavit should therefore be stricken. 
3. Affidavit of plaintiff Joanna Banford is also irrelevant and 
should be stricken. Banford alleges Clay Stevenson, an adjuster for Reliance 
Insurance, told her "that everything would be taken care o f and "our client 
is at fault and we will get this settled." This is not a written acceptance of 
the claim and is so vague as to be irrelevant. Moreover, plaintiff retained 
counsel after this statement was made, seven months prior to the 
November 16, 1995, letter. It was simply improperly drafted and served 
after the alleged statement through no fault of Kaysville or Reliance. 
Moreover, no reasonable lawyer would deem this verbal statement as 
constituting a reason to forego the clear requirements of the governmental 
immunity act. Accordingly, this statement is irrelevant. Finally statements 
regarding Reliance's settlement offers and promises to pay medical bills are 
inadmissable pursuant to Rules 408 and 409 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(R. 84-85) 
Although the court rejected these affidavits, Defendants renew their objection to their 
inclusion in Plaintiffs brief for the reasons contained above. 
13. Plaintiffs were represented by counsel at least two months prior to the July 12, 
1995, letter and at least seven months prior to the November 16, 1995, letter. (Appellees 
Brief, p. 3,13). 
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14. Defendants agree with the remainder of Plaintiffs/Appellants' Statement of 
Facts ffif 15 through 21. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Claimants seeking relief under the Governmental Immunity Act must strictly comply 
with the notice of claim provisions of the Act. Neither the letter of July 12, 1995, nor the 
letter of November 16, 1995, constitute a proper notice of claim under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Neither letter specified the necessary information to constitute 
a notice of claim. Neither letter was filed with the governing body of Kaysville City as is 
mandated by U.C.A. § 63-30-14(1995). Indeed, the letter of July 12, 1995, was not even 
signed by plaintiffs or their attorney. The letter of November 16, 1995, fails to specify it 
was a notice of claim and was not filed upon the governing body of Kaysville City as 
required by U.C.A. § 63-30-13 (1995). 
Even if the letter can be deemed a notice of claim, it was service of the notice upon 
the city finance manager is not proper service pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-30-13 because the 
letters were not directed to or served upon the governing body of the city. In this case, the 
governing body of Kaysville is the mayor and city council. U.C.A. § 10-1-104(2). Service 
of a notice of claim on the governing body of the entity is a statutory prerequisite to suit, and 
plaintiffs' failure to do so deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the statement in a letter from Dean Storey, "contact me as the city 
representative" does not create an estoppel because it was in response to plaintiffs' counsel's 
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letter and did not say to file the claim with him. Because plaintiffs were represented by 
counsel for at least two months prior to the filing of the first alleged notice of claim in July 
1995, plaintiffs' estoppel arguments should be rejected. 
In addition, the lawsuit was not timely filed. Plaintiffs suit was filed more than one 
year after the claim was deemed denied. Accordingly, the court lacked jurisdiction over the 
case. Plaintiff cannot salvage the process by attempting to introduce evidence of office 
custom and practice. The proffered affidavits only establish general office policy and not 
specific facts about this notice. Accordingly, because the letter of November 16, 1995, was 
deemed file the same day it was dated and mailed, plaintiffs' suit is not timely. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROPERLY DRAFT AND 
SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM UPON THE GOVERNING BODY OF 
KAYSVILLE CITY. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 63-30-1, etseq., (hereinafter, the Act) sets 
forth the procedures that a litigant suing the State of Utah, or one of its political subdivisions, 
must follow. Section 63-30-11 requires a claimant to file a written notice of claim with the 
government entity as a prerequisite to filing an action in court. 
U.C.A. § 63-30-11 mandates that a notice of claim contain the following information: 
(3)(a) The notice of the claim asserted shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
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(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
U.C.A. § 63-30-1 l(1995)(emphasis added). 
The Act further provides: 
A claim against a political subdivision . . , is barred unless notice of 
claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision 
within one year after the claim arises. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (emphasis added). 
Service of a notice of claim on the governing body of the entity is a statutory 
prerequisite to suit, and plaintiffs' failure to do so deprives the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Larson v. Park City Corporation, 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998); Bellonio v. Salt 
Lake Citv Corporation, 911 P.2d 1294, 1298 (Utah App. 1996). In Bellonio v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's refusal to dismiss the complaint 
for failure to comply strictly with the requirements of § 63-30-13, noting that: 
[s]ince a Notice of Claim is a statutory prerequisite to suit, the trial court was 
without jurisdiction to hear Bellonio's case and erred by allowing him to 
proceed. 
BelioniQ, 911 P.2d at 1298. 
The notice of claim requirements in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act have 
always been treated as jurisdictional by Utah courts. As the court in Nielson v. Gurley. 888 
P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1994), explained: 
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The failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, and 
therefore compliance with the act is a precondition to maintaining an action. 
Nielson. 888 P.2d at 13; see also Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transportation, 828 P.2d 
535, 540-1 (Utah App. 1992); Madsen v. BorthicL 769 P.2d 245,250 (Utah 1988) (improper 
notice deprives court of jurisdiction). 
A. Plaintiffs Must Strictly Comply with the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Before analyzing plaintiffs' failure to comply with the provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, the standard of compliance must first be established. Plaintiffs 
have incorrectly argued "substantial compliance" is all that is necessary. Although the 
haphazard effort to file a notice of claim in this case does not even constitute "substantial 
compliance," Utah appellate court decisions have repeatedly rejected substantial compliance 
and specifically adopted strict compliance as the legal standard for the filing and service of 
notices of claims. 
In Bellonio v. Salt Lake City, 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1996), the court stated: 
Nevertheless, in two recent opinions from this court, plaintiffs have been 
allowed to proceed despite certain inadequacies in their notice of claim filings. 
See BischeL 907 P.2d at 279; Brittain. 882 P.2d at 672-73. However, the 
precedential effect of those cases is limited by their unique factual 
underpinnings and, therefore, neither should be construed as an indication that 
we are prepared to abrogate the long-standing rule requiring strict compliance 
with all aspects of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Id. at 1296 (emphasis added). 
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As the court stated in Bischel v. Meritt 907 P.2d, 275, 279 (Utah App. 1995), "Utah 
courts have established a rule of strict compliance with the notice provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act." See, e.g.. Yates v. Vernal Family Health Ctr.. 617 P.2d 352, 
354 (Utah 1980); Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Trans.. 828 P.2d 535, 541 (Utah App. 
1992)." (Emphasis added). 
Although plaintiffs have not even substantially complied with the act, under the 
clearly established standard of "strict compliance," plaintiffs' letters of July 12, 1995, and 
November 16, 1995, fall far short of strict compliance as is outlined below. 
B. The Letter of July 12. 1995 Does Not Comply with the Act. 
The July 12, 1995, letter addressed "to whom it may concern" failed to comply with 
63-30-11. Specifically, it did not contain a the statement of facts, the nature of the claim 
asserted or the damages incurred by the claimant so far as known and was not served upon 
the governing body of Kaysville City. The alleged notice of claim merely states the date of 
the accident, the name of the driver of the Kaysville vehicle and requests the name of the 
City's insurance carrier. It contains no information regarding the facts of the accident nor 
any facts about damages. It was not even signed by the claimant or her attorney. 
This terse letter hardly constitutes compliance with the above provisions. The letter 
failed to specify the nature of the claim, facts or damages as mandated by the above section. 
Because plaintiffs failed to provide the necessary information mandated by U.C.A. § 63-30-
11, the court should affirm the judgment of dismissal in this case. 
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Even if this letter is deemed a sufficient notice of claim, it was not properly served 
upon the governing body of Kaysville. A letter addressed to "Kaysville City, To Whom It 
May Concern"is not service upon the governing body. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a letter simply addressed to "Kaysville City, 
to whom it may concern" can constitute compliance with the act when this court has 
rejected a much more thorough, albeit misguided, effort that occurred in Bellonio. At least 
in Bellonio. the claimant addressed the letter to the Airport Authority and City Attorney. 
Nonetheless, this court held notice insufficient because the notice was not filed with the 
city council. 
C. The Letter of November 16. 1995. Does Not Comply with the Act. 
The letter of November 16,1995, sent to Dean Storey, City Finance Director does not 
constitute strict compliance with the Act. The letter of November 16, 1995, is no more a 
notice of claim than any other letter sent between July 5, 1995 and November 16, 1995. 
Even if the letter of November 16, 1995 contained sufficient facts to qualify as a 
notice of claim, the Banfords did not file their notice of claim with the governing body of 
Kaysville City. U.C.A. § 10-1-104(2) defines the governing body as "collectively the legis-
lative body and executive of any municipality." Subsection (2)(b) defines the governing 
body of a city of the third class as the City Council. 
Banfords' argument that because the definition of "governing body" is not specified 
in the Governmental Immunity Act excuses their non-compliance has been specifically 
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rejected by the Utah Supreme Court and this court. In Larson v. Park City Corp.,955 P.2d 
343 (Utah 1998), the court stated: 
The Act clearly provides that the notice of claim must be filed with the 
"governing body" of a political subdivision. Unfortunately, the term 
"governing body" is not defined within the Act itself. However, the term 
"governing body" is defined in the general provisions of the Utah Code 
dealing with cities and towns, known as the Utah Municipal Code. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 10-1-101 through 10-15-6. Subsection -104(2) defines "governing 
body" as follows: 
"Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and 
the executive of any municipality. Unless otherwise provided: 
(a) In cities of the first and second class, the governing body is 
the city commission: 
(b) In cities of the third class, the governing body is the city 
council [.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(2) (1996). Furthermore, section 10-3-105 states: 
The governing body of cities of the third class shall be a council 
composed of six members one of whom shall be the mayor and 
the remaining five shall be councilmen. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-105 (1996). Therefore, Larson was required to file her 
notice of claim with the city council because Park City is a city of the third 
class. 
Larson, 955 P.2d at 345. 
Similarly, in Bellonio v. Salt Lake City. 911 P.2d 1294, 1296 n.2 (Utah App. 1999), 
this court specified that Title 10 governs the definition of governing body. 
In this case, the governing body of Kaysville is the mayor and city council. U.C.A. 
§ 10-1-104(2). Letters "to whom it may concern" or to Dean Storey, the city finance 
director, do not constitute service upon the governing body of Kaysville City. 
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Clearly acknowledging insufficient service, plaintiffs attempt to excuse their lack of 
compliance with the mandatory requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-
30-14, by raising several arguments that have been repeatedly rejected by Utah appellate 
courts. Plaintiffs' specific arguments are discussed below. 
D. Actual Knowledge of the Claim by City or Its Insurance Carrier Does Not 
Salvage a Defective Notice of Claim. 
Plaintiffs argue that because defendants' mayor, city finance director and insurance 
company had actual knowledge of the claim through phone conversations with plaintiff 
Joanna Banford, her lawyer and her friend, the purposes of the Act have been met. In Busch 
v. Salt Lake International Airport. 921 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1996), the court specifically held 
that knowledge of the claim on the part of the city risk manager, attorney or insurance 
company does not validate improper service. As the court stated in Busch v. Salt Lake 
International Airport. 921 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1996): 
The Governmental Immunity Act serves two important purposes. First, 
it affords the responsible public authorities an opportunity to investigate, 
settle, or deny a claim without expending public revenue for costly and 
unnecessary litigation. Brittain. 882 P.2d at 671. Also, compliance with the 
Governmental Immunity Act provides an opportunity to those vested with 
authority to remedy a dangerous condition so that further damage or injury can 
be avoided. S c ^ v. Southworth. 563 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1977). The city 
recorder and city attorney are not members of the governing body. Bellonio. 
911 P.2d at 1296. Unless specifically authorized by the governing body, 
neither has the power to settle a claim or to remedy a dangerous condition. 
We conclude that the first notice of claim served upon the city recorder 
and the city attorney was not sufficient to give notice of the claim to the 
governing body of Salt Lake City. To provide notice to the governing body of 
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a city under the Governmental Immunity Act, a notice of claim must be served 
upon the mayor or city council 
Id. at 472. 
Therefore, knowledge of the claim by the city finance director, the mayor and 
Reliance Insurance is irrelevant. Defective service of the notice of claim is jurisdictional and 
defendants have no duty to point out those deficiencies during settlement negotiations. 
Accordingly, this court should hold that it lacks jurisdiction as a matter of law. Indeed, any 
other holding would vitiate the notice of claim provision. Knowledge, however remote, of 
a potential claim by any city official could constitute notice under plaintiffs' argument. The 
reason that the court has repeatedly rejected this argument is precisely because of the lack 
of certainty and confusion such a drastic departure from precedence such a decision would 
cause. This court should reject plaintiffs' attempts to resurrect the "actual notice cures a 
defective notice of claim" argument. 
E. Kaysville and Reliance Insurance Did Not Waive Compliance with the 
Governmental Immunity Act and Are Not Estopped to Assert Jurisdiction and 
Limitations as a Defense. 
The Banfords have apparently argued that the verbal and written responses from 
Kaysville City and Reliance Insurance constitute waiver or estoppel to deny the claim. Utah 
courts have been reluctant to apply estoppel analysis to notices of claims. As recently as this 
year, the court rejected a claim of estoppel in Shunk v. State. 924 P.2d 879 (Utah 1996). In 
Shunk, the court rejected plaintiffs estoppel argument by holding that estoppel applies only 
when an agency of the state (or political subdivision) gives erroneous information to a 
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claimant which prevented her from timely filing a proper Notice of Claim. In the Shunk 
case, the plaintiff failed to properly serve the notice of claim on the proper authorities. The 
defendants simply did not notify plaintiff of the deficient notice. The court further stated: 
Shunk points out, however that the notice of claim which he filed with the 
state department of education and the attorney general contained a request for 
assistance in the event that Shunk had not notified the proper governmental 
entity. Where the statutes are clear, as in this case, as to the requirement that 
for serving a notice on a political subdivision, we cannot require and the 
statutes do not require that the state or its political subdivisions promptly 
notify claimants of deficiencies of the notice of claim so as to allow them an 
opportunity to timely rectify their error or deficiency. 
Id at 882. 
Thus, the Banfords' argument that Kaysville has waived or is estopped to assert 
deficiencies is unavailing in light of the express language of this recent, unanimous decision 
of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Additionally, counsel cannot blame his failure to follow the statute on Kaysville. 
Indeed, in this case, the first letter of July 1995 from Plaintiffs' attorney specifically asked 
for information regarding the city's insurance carrier and stated "[p]lease have a repre-
sentative of your insurance company contact us as soon as possible but no later than thirty 
days from the date of this letter. This will eliminate the need for us to contact you further." 
Apparently, no further communication was planned with Kaysville. Storey's response did 
nothing to mislead counsel or otherwise validate this letter as a notice of claim. The response 
did not admit liability. Plaintiffs' argument that "please contact me as the city repre-
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sentative" somehow misled them into filing a defective notice of claim is merit less. Storey 
did not say, "please file your notice of claim with me." 
After apparently unsuccessful negotiations with Reliance, plaintiffs' counsel sent 
another letter to Storey. It is this letter that plaintiffs now claim is their notice of claim. The 
letter of November 16 is hardly a notice of claim. The letter states "[m]y purpose in 
contacting you directly is to obtain some help with your insurance company." Moreover, 
in the letter, Mr. Sondgeroth then goes on to complain about the treatment his client had 
received from Mr. Clay Stevens. Additionally, the letter states: 
My letter is a direct result of this behavior on his part . . . please advise 
whether you can help my clients gain a better attitude from your insurance 
provider. I sincerely hope that we can work together to minimize this conflict 
and obtain appropriate compensation for the injuries that have occurred. The 
process so far has been quite intolerable. 
The letter was not intended to be a notice of claim. In fact, this is hardly the type of 
letter one would write about a claims agent who allegedly accepted liability for the accident 
on behalf of Kaysville. It certainly does not indicate that Reliance lulled plaintiff or her 
attorney into a false sense of complacency as is required by Rice for estoppel to apply. 
Rice v. Granite School District 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969), involved an unrepresented 
woman who was actively led to believe that she did not need counsel and that her claim had 
been accepted. In this case, the Banfords had counsel for at least seven months prior to the 
filing of their alleged notice of claim. The notice of claim simply is deficient. No amount 
of good faith negotiation or discussions regarding medical records can constitute waiver or 
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estoppel. To hold otherwise would bar efforts to settle cases early on if there was any 
question as to the validity of a notice of claim. Moreover, the exhibits to plaintiffs' 
memorandum do not demonstrate any active effort to mislead. Unlike the plaintiff in Rice, 
the Banfords were represented by counsel who presumably can read the clear and unambigu-
ous language of the statute. Reliance is under no obligation to point out deficiencies in the 
notice. Shunk v. State. 924 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1996). 
Courts have routinely held that mere communication with counsel while the statute 
is running, without some active effort to mislead the plaintiffs into a false sense of 
complacency, does not create an estoppel. 
In Lund v.Hall. 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997), the plaintiff filed an action after the statute 
of limitations had expired. Relying upon Rice v. Granite School District. 23 Utah 2d, 22, 
456 P.2d 159 (1969), the principal case the Banfords cite in support of their claims, Lund 
argued that defendants should be estopped to argue statute of limitations because "she was 
involved in on-going settlement negotiations with State Farm 'immediately prior to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations and that State Farm had not provided her with notice 
of the running of the statute of limitations as required by law." Lund v. Hall. 938 P.2d 
at 288. The court rejected the argument holding that there was nothing in the letter that 
led the plaintiff to sit on her rights. Moreover the court distinguished Rice by stating, 
" . . . unlike the plaintiff in Rice. Lund was represented by an attorney prior to the time 
she received the letter from State Farm." Lund. 938 P.2d at 288. 
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Bischel v. Merrit 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995) is also inapplicable to the facts of 
this case. The plaintiff in Bischel phoned the Salt Lake County Commission and was given 
erroneous information on where to file her notice of claim. Bischel is distinguishable 
because the defendant providing misleading information resulting in defective service of the 
notice of claim. 
In this case there is no evidence of false or intentionally misleading information. 
Statements such as "contact me as the city's representative" by Kaysville's Storey or "I am 
now handling the case" by Reliance's Letisa Mckenzie do not provide any false information 
that would lead a reasonable attorney to believe that compliance with the statute has been 
waived. Plaintiffs' attempt to construe statements regarding a desire to settle or vague 
comments that the Banfords "would be taken care o f as creating an estoppel simply do not 
meet the necessary level of evidence necessary to create disputed issues of fact. 
Accordingly, Kaysville is not estopped to assert lack of jurisdiction. There is no 
evidence that anyone from Kaysville provided any false information to the Banfords or their 
counsel regarding the notice of claim. Neither Kaysville nor Reliance was under any 
obligation to notify plaintiffs or their counsel of the deficiency in the notice of claim. Shunk 
v. State. 924 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1996). Indeed, the letter of November 16, 1995 diverged 
so far from the standard notice of claim that someone receiving the letter may not even have 
realized it was a notice of claim. Accordingly, the facts as alleged by plaintiffs, even if taken 
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as true, do not give rise to a material disputed issue of fact to support a claim of estoppel. 
This court should affirm the judgment of dismissal. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' LAWSUIT IS UNTIMELY 
Although not decided by the trial court in its ruling, this court can affirm the trial 
court's ruling on other grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other ground. 
Debry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). The untimeliness of plaintiffs' suit is an 
additional ground affirming the Order of Dismissal. 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-14 provides that a governmental entity has ninety days 
to act upon a notice of claim or it is deemed denied. U.C.A. § 63-30-15 provides that a 
claimant must file an action against the governmental entity within one year after the claim 
is denied or the action is barred. If the July 12, 1995 letter is deemed to be plaintiffs' notice 
of claim, plaintiffs' suit filed February 18, 1997, is clearly untimely. Thus, in order for the 
timing to be relevant, this court would have to accept the letter of November 16, 1995, as a 
valid notice of claim. That notice of claim was rejected ninety days after it was served. 
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-30-15(2), plaintiffs' suit must be filed within one year of that date. 
A. Plaintiffs' Claim Was Deemed Denied on February 14. 1996. and the Filing 
of Suit on February 18. 1997 Is Untimely Pursuant to U.C.A. S 63-30-15(2). 
The Banford's suit is untimely because it was filed more than one year after it was 
deemed denied. It is undisputed that the letter was dated November 16, 1995. Pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 63-37-1, a notice of claim is deemed served on the date it is mailed or postmarked. 
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There is no envelope and therefore the court found in its original ruling that the letter was 
mailed the date it was signed, November 16, 1995. At no point was the claim accepted or 
rejected in writing and the claim was therefore deemed denied ninety days thereafter. 
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 68-3-7, the claim was deemed denied on February 14, 1996. Plaintiffs 
did not file this action until Tuesday, February 18, 1997, more than one year after the claim 
was deemed denied. The savings provisions for weekends and holidays does not apply to 
this case because February 14, 1997 was a Friday. Thus, if the November 16, 1995, letter 
is a validly served notice of claim, the action is time barred for failure to file within one year 
after it was deemed denied as mandated by Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-15. 
Plaintiffs' complaint was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. 
Plaintiffs claims that Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides a three 
day period for mailing and therefore saves their case. The provision of Rule 6 does not apply 
when more specific provisions are contained in the code, Maverick Country Stores v. 
Industrial Commission. 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993) (U.R.C.P., Rule 6(e), three-day 
mailing provision, does not apply to time period to file an appeal of industrial commission 
order). 
In this case, a more specific provision specifies when a notice of claim is deemed 
filed and specifically accounts for mailing. Rule 6 is inconsistent with the express 
language of U.C.A § 63-37-1. Therefore, the provision of Rule 6, providing for an 
additional three days for mailing is inapplicable due to a more specific provision of U.C.A. 
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§ 63-37-1. Thus, even if plaintiffs properly filed a notice of claim on November 16, 1995, 
the suit is still untimely. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Disregarded the Affidavits of Kenneth Sondgeroth 
and His Secretary as Lacking in Foundation and Therefore Inadmissible. 
In their original memorandum, plaintiffs argued that their notice of claim was filed 
on November 16, 1995, but that the three day mailing rule applied. The court held that 
the notice was deemed filed on November 16, 1995, pursuant to U.C.A. 63-37-1 and that 
plaintiffs filed suit outside the applicable statute of limitations. Faced with untimely filing, 
plaintiffs altered their position with an allegation that the letter of November 16, 1995, was 
actually postmarked November 17, 1995, based upon standard office practice. The trial 
court properly denied plaintiffs' motion because the affidavits are not based upon 
competent evidence under Lister v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933 (Utah 
App. 1994), and should be stricken. 
Evidence of office practice must be based upon competent evidence. Lister v. Utah 
Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933 (Utah App. 1994). The affidavit cannot create 
a factual dispute as to the date of service of the notice because it is not based upon 
competent evidence. IdL Indeed, Lister v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933 
(Utah App. 1994) is right on point. Lister sued Utah Valley Community College for 
negligence. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging failure to serve the notice of 
claim upon the Attorney General as mandated by U.C.A. § 63-30-12 and filed an affidavit 
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of the lead secretary of the Litigation Division of the Utah Attorney General's Office 
which established that no notice of claim had been served upon the Attorney General. 
Lister responded by filing an affidavit from his attorney in which the attorney 
claimed that it was his standard office practice to mail notices of claims to the Attorney 
General's Office. He provided no specific evidence, however, that this notice was ever 
mailed to the Attorney General's office. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of plain-
tiffs' case for failure to properly serve the notice of claim, the court stated: 
Lister's proffered evidence fails to establish the existence of an adequate 
office mailing custom at the threshold level. He provides no direct evidence 
that the notice of claim allegedly mailed to the attorney general was ever 
prepared. Mr. Snuffer does not state that he dictated a letter addressed to 
the attorney general, signed it, or gave it to his secretary. Nor do we have 
an affidavit from Mr. Snuffer's secretary that she typed a notice addressed 
to the attorney general. We do not even have direct evidence that 
Mr. Snuffer's secretary photocopied the letter addressed to UVCC or placed 
it in an envelope addressed to the attorney general. In short, we have no 
direct evidence whatsoever pertaining to the preparation of the letter 
Mr. Snuffer's office claimed to have mailed to the attorney general. 
Consequently, viewed in a light most favorable to Lister's claim, 
Mr. Snuffer's affidavits are insufficient to establish a material issue of fact 
as to whether a notice of claim was mailed to the attorney general. 
Id. at 941. (Emphasis added). 
In this case, plaintiffs' affidavit establishes only that the office routine was to review 
the letter at the end of the day and place it in the outgoing mail box which would be picked 
up and post marked the next day. This evidence is not competent under Lister because 
neither Sondgeroth nor his secretary testify that they have personal knowledge that they 
did not place the letter in the mail until after 10:30 a.m on November 16, 1995. It is just 
23 
as likely that the letter could have been dictated and signed the day before or that morning 
and mailed in the morning pickup on the 16th. Because this office routine evidence is 
inadmissable as speculative and incompetent, this court should disregard plaintiffs' 
proffered affidavits and strike them from the record. This court should affirm the trial 
courts dismissal because plaintiffs' suit was not timely filed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court should affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
DATED this /&* day of February, 1999. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Har, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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I state that I am the attorney for Kaysville City Defendants herein; that I served the 
attached Brief of Appellees (Case Number 980300-CA, Utah Court of Appeals, State of 
Utah) upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Leonard E. McGee 
Damian E. Davenport 
Lehman, Jensen & Donahue, L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
620 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and caused the same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid on the day of February, 
1999. 
STATUTORY ADDENDUM 
CITIES AND TOWNS 10-1-107 
* 1 . * > 1 . 
P a r t 2 
Maaic{ga2lties 
Municipalities as political subdivisions of the 
state. 
Power to sue, contract, adopt municipal name 
and seal. 
License fees and taxes — Application informa-
tion to be transmitted to the county assessor 
[Effective until July 1, 1997]. 
License fees and taxes — Application informa-
tion to be transmitted to the county auditor 
[Effective July 1, 1997]. 
Part 3 
Municipal Energy Sales and Use Tax Act 
HM-301. Title [Effective July 1, 1997]. 
10.1-302. Purpose and intent [Effective July 1, 1997]. 
UM-303. Definitions [Effective July 1, 1997]. 
10-1-304 Municipality may levy tax — Rate [Effective July 
1, 1997]. 
UM-305- Municipal energy sales and use tax ordinance 
provisions [Effective July 1, 1997]. 
10-1-306. Rules for delivered value and point of sale. 
10-1-307. Collection of taxes by commission — Distribution 
of revenues — Charge for services — CoKection 
of taxes by municipality [Effective July 1, 
1997]. 
HM-308. Report of tax collections — Allocation when loca-
tion of taxpayer cannot be accurately deter-
mined [Effective July 1, 1997]. 
10-1-309. Effective date of levy [Effective July 1, 1997]. 
10-1-310. Existing energy franchise taxes or contractual 
franchise fees [Effective July 1, 1997]. 
P A R T I 
SHORT TITLE, DEFINITIONS, REPEALER, AND 
SCOPE OF CODE 
W-l-101. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Municipal Code." In enacting this code, it is the legislative 
°U*nt to repeal only those provisions of Utah law set forth in 
"ction 10-1-114. It is the legislative intent to review, modern-
~* and incorporate into this code in later sessions other 
^visions of Utah law relating to municipalities not included 
this act. Provisions of Utah law not specifically repealed 
" 1^1 continue in effect. 1077 
I(M-102. Effective date . 
*kis act shall become effective July 1,1977. 1977 
;M03. Construction. 
j f n e powers herein delegated to any municipality shall be 
rurally construed to permit the municipality to exercise the 
j. e r s S^nted by this act except in cases clearly contrary to 





** used jn this act: 
i <1) "Municipal" or "municipalities" means any city of 
tne hrst class, city of the second d«ss, city of the ihird 
c
»ass, or town in the state of Utah, but unless the context 
otherwise provides, the term or terms do not include 
counties, school districts, or any other special purpose 
governments. 
(2) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative 
body and the executive of any municipality. Unless other-
wise provided: 
(a) In cities of the first and second class, the 
governing body is the city commission; 
(b) In cities of the third class, the governing body is 
the city council; 
(c) In towns the governing body is the town coun-
cil. 
(3) "City" shall include cities of the first class, cities of 
the second class or cities of the third class or may refer 
cumulatively to all such cities. 
(4) "Town" means any town as defined in Section 10-2-
301. 
(5) "Recorder," unless clearly inapplicable, shall in-
clude and apply to town clerks. 
(6) "Provisions of law" shall include other statutes of 
the state of Utah and ordinances, rules and regulations 
properly adopted by any municipality unless the construc-
tion is clearly contrary to the intent of state law. 
(7) "Contiguous" means abutting directly on the exist-
ing boundary of the annexing municipality. "Directly" 
includes separation by a street, alley, public right-of-way, 
creek, river or the right-of-way of a railroad or other 
public service corporation, or by lands owned by the 
municipality, by some other political subdivision of the 
state or by the state. 
(8) "Affected entities" means a county, municipality or 
other entity possessing taxation powers within a county, 
whose territory, service delivery or revenue will be di-
rectly and significantly affected by a proposed boundary 
change involving a municipality or other local entity. 
(9) "Peninsula" means an area of unincorporated terri-
tory surrounded on more than one-half of its boundary 
distance, but not completely, by incorporated territory and 
situated so that the length of a line drawn across the 
unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an 
incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than 
25% of the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorpo-
rated area. 
(10) "Island" means unincorporated territory com-
pletely surrounded by incorporated area of one or more 
municipalities. 
(11) "Urban development" means a housing subdivision 
involving more than 15 residential units with an average 
of less than one acre per residential unit or a commercial 
or industrial development for which cost projections ex-
ceed $750,000 for any or all phases. 1070 
10-1-105. No changes intended. 
^nless otherwise specifically provided in this act, the pro-
v ^ o n s of this act shall not operate in any way to affect the 
Property or contract rights or other actions which may exist in 
favt>r of or against any municipality. Nor shall this act operate 
i n
 any way to change or affect any ordinance, order or 
resc)lution in force in any municipality and such ordinances, 
ordfcrs and resolutions which are not repugnant to law, shall 
c o nt inue in full force and effect until repealed or amended. 
1077 
10-1-106. Scope of act. 
This act shall apply to all municipalities incorporated or 
existing under the law of the State of Utah except as otherwise 
sPe<:ifically excepted by the home rule provisions of Article XI, 
Sect-ion 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 1077 
!<H-107. Municipal i t ies . 
All municipalities which have been incorporated under any 
previous act of the United States or of the State of Utah shall 
be t^cated as properly incorporated under this act. 1077 
631 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 63-30-15 
(8) or in connection with the collection of and assess-
ment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
r i l ) any natural condition on publicly owned or con-
trolled lands, any condition existing in connection with an 
abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity 
authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration or the Division of Sovereign Lands and 
Forestry; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management 
or seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or 
natural disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or 
storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being 
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 
41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, 
culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located 
on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of 
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other 
public improvement; or 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous 
materials or hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies. 1995 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private 
property without compensation. 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Consti-
tution, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmen-
tal entity when the governmental entity has taken or dam-
aged private property for public uses without jus t compensa-
tion. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according 
to the requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
1991 
63-30-10.6. At torneys* fees for r e c o r d s r e q u e s t s . 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for recovery of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 
and 63-2-802. 
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11: 
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsec-
tion (1) may be filed contemporaneously with a petition 
for review under Section 63-2-404; and 
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply. 
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a 
claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought 
contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in a 
subsequent action. 1992 
63-30-11. C l a i m for i n j u r y — Not ice — C o n t e n t s — 
Service — Legal disability. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that 
*ould apply if the claim were against a private person begins 
to run 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a govern-
mental entity, or against an employee for an act or omission 
b u r r i n g during the performance of his duties, within the 
^ P e of employment, or under color of authority shall file a 
written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an 
action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to 
the claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief s ta tement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as 
they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that 
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; 
and 
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible gov-
ernmental entity according to the requirements of 
Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian a t the 
time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court 
to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental 
entity, the court may extend the time for service of 
notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that 
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an exten-
sion, the court shall consider whether the delay in serving 
the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the gov-
ernmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
1991 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time 
for filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act 
or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is 
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general 
and the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time 
granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 1987 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its em-
ployee — Time for filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its em-
ployee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
governing body of the political subdivision within one year 
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension 
of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether 
or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 1987 
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by 
governmental entity or insurance carrier 
within ninety days. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental 
entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the 
claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be 
deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day 
period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 1965 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and 
time for filing action aguinst governmental 
entity. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action 
in the district court against the governmental entity or an 
employee of the entity. 
63-30-16 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year 
after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial 
period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is charac-
terized as governmental. 1987 
63-30-16. Jur isdic t ion of district courts over act ions — 
Applicat ion of Rules of Civil Procedure . 
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction 
over any action brought under this chapter, and such actions 
shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so 
far as they are consistent with this chapter. 1983 
63-30-17. Venue of act ions. 
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in 
which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against 
a county may be brought in the county in which the claim 
arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a 
district court judge of the defendant county, in any county 
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex 
parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions including 
cities and towns, shall be brought in the county in which the 
political subdivision is located or in the county in which the 
claim arose. 1983 
63-30-18. Compromise and set t lement of act ions . 
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal 
officer or other legal counsel if it does not have a legal officer, 
may compromise and settle any action as to the damages or 
other relief sought. 
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative 
Services may: 
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000 or less 
in damages filed against the state for which the Risk 
Management Fund may be liable; 
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his 
representative and the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services, compromise and settle 
any claim of $25,000 to $100,000 in damages for which the 
Risk Management Fund may be liable; and 
(3) The risk manager shall comply with procedures and 
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 38b, in compromising and 
settling any claim of $100,000 or more. 1995 
63-30-19. Undertak ing required of plaintiff in act ion. 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall file an 
undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but in no case less 
than the sum of $300, conditioned upon payment by the 
plaintiff of taxable costs incur. A by the governmental ei*t *y 
in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails 
to recover judgment. 19«5 
63-30-20. J u d g m e n t against governmental ent i ty bars 
act ion against employee . 
Judgment against a governmental entity in an action 
brought under this act shall constitute a complete bar to any 
action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, 
against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the 
claim. 1966 
63-30-21. Repealed . 1978 
63-30-22. Exemplary or punit ive damages prohibited 
— Governmental ent i ty exempt from execu-
t ion, at tachment , or garnishment . 
(1) (a) No judgment may be rendered against the govern-
ments! entity for exemplary or pumHve damages. 
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or portion of any 
judgment entered against a state employee in the employ-
ee's personal capacity even if the judgment is for or 
includes exemplary or punitive damages if the state 
would be required to pay the judgment under! 
63-30-36 or 63-30-37. | 
(2) Execution, attachment, or garnishment may nj 
against a governmental entity. 
63-30-23. Payment of claim or judgment aga i 
— Presentment for payment. 
Any claim approved by the state as defined by Su 
63-30-2(1) or any final judgment obtained against tlj 
shall be presented to the state risk manager, or to th 
agency, institution or other instrumentality involved i 
ment, if payment by said instrumentality is otherwise? 
ted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law the 
judgment or claim shall be presented to the board of ex 
ers and the board shall proceed as provided in Section 63 
63-30-24. Payment of claim or judgment against p 9 
cal subdivis ion — Procedure by govefS 
body. $% 
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or anyJJ 
judgment obtained against a political subdivision shaft 
submitted to the governing body thereof to be paid fortKi 
from the general funds of said political subdivision unlealj 
funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted bjH 
or contract for other purposes. 
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against poll 
cal subdivision — Installment payments.^! 
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award dun 
the current fiscal year it may pay the claim or award ihjj 
more than ten ensuing annual installments of equal size or 
such other installments as are agreeable to the claimant^ 
63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims or | 
chase of insurance created by political su 
visions. 
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a re 
fund or may jointly with one or more other political sub 
sions make contributions to a joint reserve fund, for 
purpose of making payment of claims against the co-operataj 
subdivisions when they become payable pursuant to thj 
chapter, or for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance| 
protect the co-operating subdivisions from any or all rial 
created by this chapter. 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for ptjp 
ment of claims, judgments, or insurance pre-
miums. 
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, ife 
political subdivisions may levy an annual property tax sufljg 
cient to pay the following: 
(a) any claim; 
(b) any settlement; 
(c) any judgment, including any judgment against afl> 
elected official or employee of any political subdivision^ 
including peace officers, based upon a claim for punitrfl^ 
damages but the authority of a political subdivision fa* 
the payment of any judgment for punitive damages ^ ' 
limited in any individual case to $10,000; 
(d) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, ofj 
judgment; or 
(e) the establishment and maintenance of a reserrl 
fund for the payment of claims, settlements, or judgment! 
as nay he rea3m ib!v pr.w ^ - * *»J 
(2) It is legislative intent that the payments authorized fa 
punitive damage judgments or to pay the premium for such 
insurance as authorized is money spent for a public purpof* 
within the meaning of this section and Article XIII, Sec 5, 
Utah Constitution, even though as a result of the levy tb* 
STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 63-37-3 
(2) operation of state vehicles or equipment when he is 
^>erly licensed for that operation; and 
*f3) liability protection and indemnification normally 
-jfbrded salaried employees. 1981 
***i-l2. A p p r ° v a l prerequis i te to volunteer service — 
f^* Rules and regulat ions . 
i\) Volunteers may not donate any service to the Depart-
.Stof Natural Resources or its divisions unless and until the 
S t program in which volunteers would serve has first been 
fj^ved, in writing, by the executive director of the Depart-
| 2 t o f Natural Resources and the Department of Human 
Source Management. 
> gTvolunteer services shall comply with any rules adopted 
wtfic Department of Human Resource Management relating 
Jfthat service that are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
Jctions 63-34-9 through 63-34-12. 
CHAPTER 34a 
SEISMIC SAFETY 
(Terminated by Laws 1977, ch. 234, § 10.) 
044a-l to 63-34a-9. Terminated. 
CHAPTER 35 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
(Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407.) 
IW5-1 to 63-35-13. Repealed . 
CHAPTER 35a 
SOCIAL SERVICE LICENSURE 
(Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407.) 
C-35a-l to 63-35a-16. Repealed . 
CHAPTER 36 
INDIAN AFFAIRS 
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241, 
§§ 342 to 367.) 
Section 
G3-36-1 to 63-36-8. Repealed. 
«-36-9 to 63-36-21. Renumbered. 
63-36-101 to 63-36-213. Renumbered. 
S3-36-1 to 63-36-8. Repea led . 
•3-36.9 to 63-36-21. Renumbered as §§ 63-36-201 to 63-
36-213. 1991 
•3-36-101 to 63-36-213. Renumbered as §§ 9-9-101 to 
9-9-213. 1992 
CHAPTER 36a 
TASK FORCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS 
(Repealed by Laws 1991, ch. 218, § 1.) 







MAILING REPORTS, CLAIMS, 
RETURNS, STATEMENTS AND 
OTHER DOCUMENTS TO 
STATE OR POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISIONS 
When postmark date deemed filing date — When 
mailing date deemed filing date. 
Registered or certified mail — Record as proof of 
delivery. 
Filing date falling on Saturday, Sunday or legal 
holiday. 
1988 63-37-1. When postmark date d e e m e d filing date — 
When mail ing date d e e m e d filing date. 
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or other document 
or any payment required or authorized to be filed or made to 
the state of Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof, which 
is: 
(1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall 
be deemed filed or made and received by the state or 
political subdivisions on the date shown by the post-office 
cancellation mark stamped upon the envelope or other 
appropriate wrapper containing it. 
(2) Mailed but not received by the state or political 
subdivisions where received and the cancellation mark is 
illegible, erroneous, or omitted, shall be deemed filed or 
made and received on the date it was mailed if the sender 
establishes by competent evidence that the report, claim, 
tax return, statement or other document or payment was 
deposited in the United States mail on or before the date 
for filing or paying; and in cases of such nonreceipt of any 
such report, tax return, statement, or other document 
required by law to be filed, the sender files with the state 
or political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days 
after written notification is given to the sender by the 
state or political subdivisions of its nonreceipt of such 
report, tax return, statement, or other document. 1967 
63-37-2. Registered or certified mail — Record as proof 
of delivery. 
If any such report, claim, tax return, statement or other 
document or payment is sent by United States mail and either 
registered or certified, a record authenticated by the United 
States post office of such registration or certification shall be 
considered competent evidence that the report, claim, tax 
return, statement or other document or payment was deliv-
ered to the state officer or state agency or officer or agency of 
the political subdivision to which addressed, and the date of 
registration or certification shall be deemed the postmarked 
date . 1967 
63-37-3. Fi l ing date fal l ing on Saturday, Sunday or 
legal holiday. 
If the date for filing any such report, claim, tax return, 
statement or other document or making any such payment 
falls upon a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, such acts shall 
be considered timely if performed on the next business day. 
1967 
CHAPTER 38 
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MAILING REPORTS, CLAIMS, 
RETURNS, STATEMENTS AND 
OTHER DOCUMENTS TO 
STATE OR POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISIONS 
When postmark date deemed filing date — When 
mailing date deemed filing date. 
Registered or certified mail — Record as proof of 
delivery. 
Filing date falling on Saturday, Sunday or legal 
holiday. 
63-37-1. When postmark date deemed filing date — 
When mailing date deemed filing date. 
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or other document 
or any payment required or authorized to be filed or made to 
the state of Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof, which 
is: 
(1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall 
be deemed filed or made and received by the state or 
political subdivisions on the date shown by the post-office 
cancellation mark stamped upon the envelope or other 
appropriate wrapper containing it. 
(2) Mailed but not received by the state or political 
subdivisions where received and the cancellation mark is 
illegible, erroneous, or omitted, shall be deemed filed or 
made and received on the date it was mailed if the sender 
establishes by competent evidence that the report, claim, 
tax return, statement or other document or payment was 
deposited in the United States mail on or before the date 
for filing or paying; and in cases of such nonreceipt of any 
such report, tax return, statement, or other document 
required tiy law to be filed, the sender files with the state 
or political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days 
after written notification is given to the sender by the 
state or political subdivisions of its nonreceipt of such 
report, tax return, statement, or other document. 1967 
63-37-2. Registered or certified mail — Record as proof 
of delivery. 
If any such report, claim, tax return, statement or other 
document or payment is sent by United States mail and either 
registered or certified, a record authenticated by the United 
States post office of such registration or certification shall be 
considered competent evidence that the report, claim, tax 
return, statement or other document or payment was deliv-
ered to the state officer or state agency or officer or agency of 
the political subdivision to which addressed, and the date of 
registration or certification shall be deemed the postmarked 
date. 1967 
63-37-3. Filing date falling on Saturday, Sunday or 
legal holiday. 
If the date for filing any such report, claim, tax return, 
statement or other document or making any such payment 
fallc upcn a Saturday Sunday CT iegal holiday, such acl 3 shall 
be considered timely if performed on the next business day. 
1967 
CHAPTER 38 
BUDGETARY PROCEDURES ACT 
Section 




continue to hold the same under the tenure thereof, 
,t those offices which are abolished, and those as to which 
1953 Afferent provision is made by these revised statutes. 
4L2-& Accrued rights not affected by repeal . 
fhis repeal of existing statutes shall not affect any act done, 
right accruing or which has accrued or has been estab-
Shed, or any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil 
f^Le before the time when such repeal takes effect; but the 
-^ceedings in such cases shall be conformed to the provisions 
Jthese revised statutes as far as consistent. 1953 
lg.2-7. Effect on l imitat ion of act ions . 
When a limitation or period of time prescribed in any 
listing statute for acquiring a right or barring a remedy, or 
fer any other purpose, has begun to run before these revised 
lUtutes go into effect, and the same or any other limitation is 
prescribed in these revised statutes, the time which has 
already run shall be deemed a part of the time prescribed as 
ioch limitation by these revised statutes. 1953 
jg-2-8. Effect on offenses committed . 
No offense committed, and no penalty or forfeiture incurred, 
under any statute hereby repealed before the repeal takes 
effect shall be affected by the repeal, except that when a 
punishment, penalty or forfeiture is mitigated by the provi-
tions herein contained such provisions shall be applied to a 
judgment pronounced after the repeal. 1953 
$8-2-9. Effect on suits and prosecut ions pending. 
No suit or prosecution, pending when this repeal takes 
effect, for an offense committed, or for the recovery of a 
penalty or forfeiture incurred, shall be affected by the repeal, 
but the proceedings may be conformed to the provisions of 
these revised statutes as far as consistent. 1953 
68-2-10. "Heretofore" and "hereafter" defined. 
The terms "heretofore" and "hereafter," as used in these 





68-3-1. Common law adopted. 
68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally 
construed — Rules of equity prevail. 
68-3-3. Retroactive effect. 
68-3-4. Civil and criminal remedies not merged. 
68-3-5. Effect of repeal. 
68-3-6. Identical provisions deemed a continuation, not 
new enactment. 
68-3-7. Time, how computed. 
^8*3-8. When a day appointed is a holiday. 
W-3-9. Seal, how affixed. 
68-3-10. Joint authority is authority to majority. 
68-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and phrases. 
68-3-12. Rules of construction. 
68-3-13. Printing boldface in numbered bills — Purpose 
— Effect — Power of Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel to change. 
68-3-1. Common law adopted. 
The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, 
or in conflict with, the constitution or laws of the United 
States, or the constitution or laws of this state, and so far only 
** ^ is consistent with and adapted to the natural and 
physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the 
people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of 
decision in all courts of this state. 1953 
68-3-2. Statutes in derogat ion of c o m m o n law liberally 
construed — Rules of equi ty prevail . 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation 
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the 
statutes of this state. The statutes establish the laws of this 
state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their 
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and 
to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance between 
the rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to 
the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 1953 
68-3-3. Retroact ive effect. 
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared. 1953 
68-3-4. Civil and criminal remedies not merged. 
When the violation of a right admits of both a civil and 
criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the one is not merged 
in the other. 1953 
68-3-5. Effect of repeal . 
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously 
repealed, or affect any right which has accrued, any duty 
imposed, any penalty incurred, or any action or proceeding 
commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed. 1953 
68-3-6. Ident ical provis ions d e e m e d a cont inuat ion , 
not new enactment . 
The provisions of any statute, so far as they are the same as 
those of any prior statute, shall be construed as a continuation 
of such provisions, and not as a new enactment. 1953 
68-3-7. Time, how computed. 
The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is 
computed by excluding the first day and including the last, 
unless the last is a holiday, and then it also is excluded. 1953 
68-3-8. When a day appointed is a holiday. 
Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than a work of 
necessity or mercy, is appointed by law or contract to be 
performed upon a particular day, which day falls upon a 
holiday, such act may be performed upon the next succeeding 
business day with the same effect as if it had been performed 
upon the day appointed. 1953 
68-3-9. Seal , how affixed. 
When the seal of a court or public officer is required by law 
to be affixed to any paper, the word "sear includes an impres-
sion of such seal upon the paper alone, as well as upon wax or 
a wafer affixed thereto. In all other cases the word "seal" may 
include a scroll printed or written. 1953 
68-3-10. Jo int authority is authori ty to majority. 
Words giving a joint authority to three or more public 
officers, or other persons, are to be construed as giving such 
authority to a majority of them, unless it is otherwise ex-
pressed in the act giving the authority. 1953 
68-3-11. Rules of construct ion as to words and phrases . 
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the 
context and the approved usage of the language; but technical 
words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a 
peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by 
statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and 
appropriate meaning or definition. 1953 
68-3-12. Rules of construct ion. 
(1) In the construction of these statutes, the following 
general rules shall be observed, unless such construction 
Rule 6 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 18 
Service by mail, additional time after, 
U.R.C.R 6(e). 
Third-party practice, U.R.C.R 14. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Filed depositions. 
Service upon attorney. 
—Presumption of authorization. 





Sealed pretrial depositions filed with a court 
are presumptively public under the Utah Pub-
lic and Private Writings Act (former § 78-26-1 
et seq.; see now Title 63, Chapter 2) and can be 
kept secret only on a showing of good cause. 
Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 
1095 (Utah 1990). 
Service upon attorney. 
—Presumption of authorization. 
Where defendant engaged attorney only to 
file motion but never so notified court or attor-
ney, appearance of attorney to file motion 
raised presumption that he represented defen-
dant in full action. Where defendant presented 
no clear and convincing evidence to refute pre-
sumption, notice given to attorney of date set 
for trial was good notice to defendant. Blake v. 
Blake, 17 Utah 2d 369, 412 ?.2d 454 (1966). 
When service required. 
—Default judgment. 
Plaintiff was under no duty to notify defen-
dants of default judgment entered against 
them. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656 
P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982) (decided before 1985 
addition of reference to Rule 55). 
Plaintiffs'failure to mail a copy of the default 
judgment to defendants did not invalidate the 
default judgment when defendants received the 
notice of default in time to move to set aside the 
judgment. Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. 
Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
Appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h), time for appeal 
from default judgment in city court runs from 
date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather 
than from the date of judgment. Buckner v. 
Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124,288 P.2d 
786 (1955) (but see Rule 58A(d). 
Cited in Remington-Rand, Inc. v. CNeil, 4 
Utah 2d 270, 293 P.2d 416 (1956); Pillsbury 
Mills, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 7 
Utah 2d 286, 323 P.2d 266 (1958); Dehm v. 
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976); Triple I Sup-
ply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 
(Utah 1982); Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1984); Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806 
(Utah 1986); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maverik Country Stores, 
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at 
Law § 6; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to 
352. 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 15; 
71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408, 409, 411, 413. 
A.L.R. — Construction of phrase "usual 
place of abode," or similar terms referring to 
abode, residence, or domicil, as used in statutes 
relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112. 
Service of process by mail in international 
civil action as permissible under Ha^ je Con-
vention, U2 A.L.R. Fed. 241. 
Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the 
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of 
the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or 
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, 
Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice grv :n thereunder or by 
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended 
19 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 
by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action 
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the 
extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the 
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the 
continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or 
expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to do any act 
or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending before it. 
(d) For motions —Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which may be 
heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 
5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is 
fixed by these rules, by CJA 4-501, or by order of the court. Such an order may 
for cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported 
by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as 
otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later 
than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at 
some other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or 
is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period 
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is 
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment inserted "by CJA 4-501" in the first sen-
tence of Subdivision (d). 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a), (b), 
(d), and (e) of this rule are substantially similar 
to Rule 6, F.R.C.P. 
Rule 73, cited near the end of Subdivision (b), 
was repealed upon adoption of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Cross References. — Amendment to plead-
ings to conform to evidence, time of motion for, 
U.R.C.P. 15(b). 
Commencement of action, time of service, 
U.R.C.P. 4(b). 
Corporation or association, mailing of process 
to, U.R.C.P. 4(eX5). 
Depositions, objections to errors and irregu-
larities, U.R.C.P. 32(c). 
Discharge of attachment or release of prop-
erty, U.R.C.P. 64C(0. 
Documents for state or subdivision, filing 
date on weekend or holiday, § 63-37-3. 
Election laws, weekends and holidays in-
cluded in computation of time, § 20A-1-401. 
Failure of term or vacancy in office of judge, 
proceeding not affected, § 78-7-21. 
Juvenile Court Act, time computed according 
to Rules of Civil Procedure, § 78-3a-27. 
Legal holidays enumerated, § 63-13-2. 
New trial, time of motion for, after judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, U.R.C.P. 50(c)(2). 
Order defined, U.R.C.P. 7(b)(2). 
Pleadings and other papers, service by mail, 
U.R.C.P. 5(b)(1). 
Probate Code, mailing of notice of hearing, 
§ 75-1-401. 
Reference to master, time of first meeting of 
parties after, U.R.C.P. 53(d)(1). 
Relief from judgment or order, time for mo-
tion, U.R.C.P. 60. 
Rules by district courts, U R.C.P. 83. 
Service by mail, U.R.C.P. 5(b)(1). 
Substitution of parties, time of motion for, 
U.R.C.P. 25. 
Summons mailed as alternative to personal 
service, U.R.C.P. 4(g). 
Time, how computed, § 68-3-7. 
Tribunal, board or office exceeding jurisdic-
tion, notice, U.R.C.P. 65B(e). 
Undertaking by nonresident plaintiff, timely 
filing, U.R.C.P. 12(k). 
When a day appointed is a holiday, § 68-3-8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Additional time after service by mail. 
—Administrative procedure. 
—Failure to add days. 
Waiver of objection. 
— Industrial Commission. 
Computation. 
—Months and years. 
—Sundays. 
Enlargement. 
— M.^ t*on for new trial. 
—Notice of appeal. 
Designation of record. 
—Redemption from execution sales. 
Motions and affidavits. 




KENNETH L. SONDGEROTH 
July 12,1995 
Kaysvilie City Corp. 
23 East Center 
Kaysvilie, UT 84037 
Re: Personal Injury of Joanna Banford and Amber Banford 
Date of Accident 2-18-95 
To Whom It May Concern: 
We represent Joanna Banford and Amber Banford in their claim for personal injuries 
sustained in the automobile collision of February 18,1995. David J. Quinley was driving 
a vehicle which you owned that was involved in this accident 
This letter is to request that you contact our office within tetfdays with the name of your 
insurance carrier, or to advise us of your status of insurance at the "time of the accident 
Please notify your insurance company of this accident if you have not already done so. 
Please have a representative of your insurance company contact us as soon as possible but 
no later than thirty days from the date of this letter. This will eliminate the need for us to 
contact you further. 
Thank you for your cooperation and assistance. 
Very truly yours, 
WEISS & SONDGEROTH, P.C. 
KENNETH L. SONDGEROTH 
kip:krp 
WEISS & SONDGEROTH, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
5593 Highway 95 
Bullhead City, Arizona 86426 
Phone: (520) 768-5997 
Fax: (520) 768-4343 
Settled in 1850 
• ^ 
Preserving Our Historic Past.. .Progressing Into The Future 
Kaysville City Kaysville City Corporation 23 East Center, Kaysville, Utah 84037 (801) 546-1235 • FAX (801) 544-5646 
July 25, 1995 
Mr. Kenneth L. Sondgeroth 
5593 Highway 95 
Bullhead City, Arizona 86426 
RE: Claim - Joanna and Amber Banford 
Dear Mr. Sondgeroth: 
The following information is provided as requested in your letter 
dated July 12, 1995: 
Insurance Carrier: 
City Attorney: 
Reliance Insurance Company 
Policy No. JK 2537208 
Claims Department 
P.O. Box 16025 
2390 East Camelback Road 
Phoenix, AZ 85011 
Mr. Felshaw King 
King and King Attorneys at Law 
330 North Main 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Insurance Agent: Olympus Insurance Agency 
Attn: Ruth Niemeyer 
P.O. Box 65608 
3269 South Main, Suite 102 
Salt Lake City, UT 84165-0608 
Please contact me as the City representative, 
Sincerely, 
/Dean G. Stor 
Finance Director 
WEISS & SONDGEROTH, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
5593 HIGHWAY 95 
BULLHEAD CITY, AZ 86426 
UCHARD WEISS 
CENNETH L. SONDGEROTH 
November 16, 1995 
Mr. Dean G. Storey 
Kaysville City Corporation 
23 East Center 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Re: Claim — Joanna and Amber Banford 
Dear Mr. Storey: 
It was with great relief that I received your letter of July 25,1995. As you are aware, my 
office represents both Joanna and Amber Banford in their claims that arose from a vehicle 
accident with a member of your police force. Clearly, as is evident from the police report, 
the police officer was grossly negligent and that my clients were nothing but innocent 
victims. Since the accident, my clients have attempted to take all the necessary steps to 
mitigate the damages they have incurred. Joanna Banford underwent radical surgery which, 
while relatively successful, still leaves her quite permanently disabled. 
My purpose in contacting you directly is to obtain some help with your insurance 
company. Mr. Clay Stevens has been assigned this case from Reliance Insurance 
Company. Unfortunately, Mr. Stevens has taken an abrupt and confrontational attitude 
toward my clients which has left this office, and Ms. Banford, faced with the prospect of 
filing suit to remove Mr. Stevens from this matter. Hopefully, this will not be necessary 
once you have been made aware of Mr. Stevens outrageous and unethical conduct. I 
cannot fathom anyone ratifying such conduct. The following is a brief overview of Mr. 
Stevens' conduct towards Mrs. Banford. 
Mrs. Banford has incurred significant medical bills as a result of this accident. Some of 
those bills were paid by her own auto coverage, but significant portions were not. My 
client has very limited private medical insurance which has a yearly cap. When Mr. 
Stevens was asked to pay some of the medical providers that were demanding payment, he 
stated, M We won't pay anything until you settle the whole thing with us." In the meantime, 
the medical providers have sent some bills to collection for nonpayment. This office has 
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Kaysville City Corporation 
August 9, 1995 
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solicited liens from all of the providers to stop such action, but some providers do not take 
liens. This has resulted in great frustration and worry to my client. 
Amber Banford was the minor who has sustained head injuries in this accident. She 
continues to suffer from dizziness and other symptoms of head trauma. Mr. Stevens has 
already made an offer on her damages without knowing the full extent of the damages that 
have been incurred. It is clear from his attitude that he is attempting to put Mrs. Banford 
into such a financial bind that she will compromise the health of her child to pay some 
bills. I cannot believe that anyone in a position of responsibility would tolerate this type of 
unethical conduct. It is my sincere belief, that now that you have been apprised of what 
has transpired, that the city of Kaysville would use whatever influence it possesses not to 
condone this behavior. 
Mr. Stevens has been told by my client that she is represented by an attorney. When first 
advised that she was hiring an attorney, Mr. Stevens not only told her that "she didn't need 
an attorney", but told her not to retain an attorney and became quite verbally abusive when 
she told him that she had retained my office. Since he has been advised that she is 
represented, he has continued to call her rather than my office. Furthermore, Mr. Stevens 
has also responded by verbally abusing Mrs. Banford with quite lewd language. 
My letter is a direct result of this behavior on his part. I do not wish talk to or deal with 
this man. It is my intention to turn this individual into the insurance commission for his 
conduct in this matter. I believe that your city has some influence on Reliance Insurance 
with respect to the party negotiating on your behalf. 
Mr. Stevens said that he would take care of the bills and pay $20,000 for all of Mrs. 
Banford's damages. Mrs. Banford's injuries for her shattered knee are in excess of 
$750,000. This is substantiated by settlements across the nation for injuries that have 
required bone grafting and permanent disablement. Potentially it could be much larger. 
I know that the mayor of your city has spoken to my clients. He appeared concerned that 
they be treated well. These people are clients of mine because they are close friends of my 
family. I expect that they should be treated well. The attitude of your insurance company 
will completely dictate how this office proceeds with this claim. My clients and I are 
reasonable people. However, we will not be bullied or pressured in these matters. I 
believe you can understand that. 
Mr. Dean G. Storey 
Kaysville City Corporation 
August 9,1995 
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Our office has associated with a local firm in Salt Lake City, Hadley & Hadley, on this 
matter. They are one of the preeminent personal injury firms in the State of Utah. 
Please advise whether you can help my clients gain a better attitude from your insurance 
provider. I sincerely hope that we can work together to minimize this conflict and obtain 
appropriate compensation for the injuries that have occurred. The process so far has been 
quite intolerable. 
Very truly yours, 
WEISS & SONDGEROTH, P.C. 
KLS 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS/^UNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
JOANNA BANFORD, and AMBER 
BANFORD, a minor, by and through her 
parent and natural guardian Joanna Banford, 
Plaintiffs), 
vs. 
DAVID QUINLEY, an individual and 
KAYSVILLE CITY, CORP., a Utah 
political subdivision, and KAYSVILLE 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, j 
Defendant(s). 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 970700076 
Rodney S. Page, Judge 
Defendant's Motion to dismiss came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled 
court. Plaintiff was represented by Mr. William Hadley and the Defendant was represented 
by Mr. Harry Souvall. The Court having reviewed the Memorandum submitted and having 
heard the arguments of counsel made certain rulings and required counsel to submit additional 
information on calculation of time period and took the matter under advisement. The Court 
now having received additional information from Defendant's counsel and being fully advised 
in the premises hereby rules as follows: 
On February 18, 1995, Plaintiffs were involved in an accident with a vehicle owned by 
Kaysville City and driven by a Kaysville City employee and were injured. 
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Subsequently, Plaintiffs retained an attorney to assist them, and on July 12, 1995, 
Plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to Kaysville City Corporation referring to the accident in 
question and asking the City to provide the name of their insurance carrier and to notify the 
insurance carrier within ten days. 
On July 25, 1995, Mr. Dean Storey, Kaysville City Finance Director, sent a letter to 
Plaintiffs attorney providing the required information. 
On November 16, 1995, Plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter to Mr. Dean Storey, Kaysville 
City's Finance Director, referring to the accident claiming damages and requesting help in 
getting the City's insurance carrier to provide partial payments and resolve the matter. The 
letter also indicated that Plaintiffs' then counsel, who resided in Arizona, had retained a Salt 
Lake City firm to assist in resolving the matter. 
On February 18, 1997, Plaintiffs' filed their Complaint against the Defendant in this 
Court. 
Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction arguing that Plaintiff 
had never filed a claim which met the requirements of Section 63-30-11 of the Governmental 
Immunity Act and further, that the Complaint was not timely filed, and therefore, this Court 
lacked jurisdiction. 
The Plaintiffs' claimed that their letter of November 16, 1995, sent to the City's 
Finance Director substantially complied with the notice requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act and that their Complaint was timely filed. In the alternative, they argued even 
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assuming the Complaint was not timely filed that Defendant should be estopped from 
invoking the one-year limitation period because of the acts of their insurance carrier. 
After reviewing the law in the matter and the arguments of counsel, the Court 
concluded at the hearing that the letter sent by Plaintiffs' counsel to Mr. Dean G. Storey, the 
City Finance Director, on November 16, 1995 substantially complied with the notice 
requirements of Section 63-30-11 of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
The Court now turns to the question of whether or not the Plaintiffs' Complaint was 
filed within the one-year period after denial as required by statute or in the alternative 
whether or not Defendant should be estopped from invoking the one-year limitation period. 
On those issues, the Court rules as follows: 
Section 63-37-1, UCA, 1953 as amended, provides that any report, claim, tax return, 
statement.... required to be filed or made to the State of Utah or to any political subdivision 
thereof which is: 
(1) Transmitted through the mail shall, be deemed filed or made and received 
by the State or political subdivision on the date shown by the post office 
cancellation marked stamped upon the envelope or other appropriate wrapper 
containing it. 
It is uncontroverted that the letter from Plaintiffs' attorney to Mr. Storey, City Finance 
Director, was mailed on November 16, 1995, the date it bears. 
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The law is clear that where a more explicit statutory provision exists as to the time for 
doing a certain act by mail that the more general provisions of Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not apply. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that the notice of claim filed by Plaintiff with 
Kaysville City was deemed filed on November 16, 1995. 
Section 63-30-14 of the Governmental Immunity Act provides that a claim shall be 
deemed denied if at the end of the 90-day period the Governmental entity or its insurance 
carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim. 
In this case, there is no evidence that the City or its insurance carrier either approved 
or denied the claim, and therefore, the claim is deemed denied 90 days from November 16, 
1995, pursuant to statute. 
Calculating the 90-day period pursuant to Section 63-3-7, UCA, 1953 as amended, the 
Claim was deemed denied on February 14, 1996. 
Section 63-30-15 of the Governmental Immunity Act requires that a claimant must file 
their action in the district court against the Governmental Entity or an employee within one 
year after denial of the claim. One year from the date of denial of the Claim here in question 
would be February 14, 1997, a Friday. Plaintiffs' Complaint was not filed until February 18, 
1997, clearly outside the one-year period. 
The Court, therefore, concludes that Plaintiffs' Complaint was not filed within the one-
year period as required by the Governmental Immunity Act, but that does not resolve the 
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case. Plaintiffs' have raised an issue of estoppel as a result of the alleged actions of the 
insurance carrier for the City, and the Court concludes that there are questions of fact and 
issues raised on that issue which preclude the Court from granting Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss at this time. 
Defendant's counsel is to prepare Findings and Judgment in accordance with the 
Court's Ruling and submit it to Plaintiffs' counsel at least five days prior to the time it is 
submitted to the Court for signature. 
Dated this JTT^day of December, 1997. 
By the Court: 
6<Q^W A-44> 
trictCow? District cras Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I , the undersigned, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mr. William R. Hadley Mr. Harry H. Souvall 
2225 E Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Dated this / *? day of December, 1997 




SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS 
STATE OF UTAH 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
NTY 
JOANNA BANFORD, and AMBER 
BANFORD, a minor, by and through her 
parent and natural guardian, Joanna Banford, 
Plaintiffs), 
vs. 
DAVID QUINLEY, an individual and 
KAYSVILLE CITY, CORP., a Utah 
political subdivision, and KAYSVILLE 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
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RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
COURT'S RULING ON MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No. 970700076 
Comes now the Court and having previously granted in part and denied in part 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the Plaintiff now having filed a Motion to Reconsider; 
and the Court having read Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum in support thereof and 
Defendant's Memorandum in opposition thereto, and the Court having recently read the case 
of Larsen vs Park City, a municipal corporation, decided March 27, 1998, by the Utah 
Supreme Court, 339 UAR 17 Pub. March 31, 1998, and being fully advised in the premises 
rules as follows: 
The Court hereby grants Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, and in light of the Supreme 
Court Ruling in the Larsen Case further clarifying governmental immunity act finds that the 
Court made an obvious error in law in its prior Memorandum Ruling. 
As stated by the Supreme Court in the Larsen Case. Supra, a legal action against a city 
is barred unless notice of claim is properly filed in compliance with the Utah Government 
Immunity Act. 
The Act requires that notice of claim must be filed with the "governing body" of the 
city. The Court recognized that "governing body" is not defined in the act but is, in the Utah 
Municipal Code. 10-1-101 through 10-15-6 UCA (1953) 
Section 10-1-104 (2) states "governing body, means collectively the legislative body 
and the executives of any municipality, unless otherwise provided: (a) in cities of the second 
class the governing body is the city commission; (b) in cities of the third class, the governing 
body is the city council,..." 
Section 10-3-105 provides: "Governing bodies of cities of the third class shall be a 
council composed of six members one of whom shall be the mayor, and the remaining five 
shall be councilmen." Section 10-3-105 UCA (1953) 
Kaysville City is a third-class city; and therefore, under the notice provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, notice in this case must be filed with the city council. 
Neither the Act nor the Municipal Code provides how the notice is to be filed. 
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In the matter here before the Court, notice, such as it was, was sent to a Mr. Dean 
Storey, City Finance Director. 
The City Finance Director is not one named for service of process pursuant to Rule 4, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor is his position one of significant relationship to the City 
Council under the Municipal Code such as the city recorder. 
The Court therefore concludes that the finance director of a city of the third class does 
not have such a significant relationship with the city council that service upon him would 
constitute service on the city council. 
The Utah Government Immunity Act provides that notice of claim must be filed on the 
governing body within one year from the date of the accident. Section 63-30-13 UCA 
(1953). 
Based upon the facts previously found by the Court, the accident here occurred on 
February 18, 1995. Under the Statute, Plaintiff had until February 18, 1996, to file a claim 
with the city council of Kaysville City. No claim was ever filed on the governing body as 
required by the Act, and in fact, Plaintiffs did not file their Complaint until February 18, 
1997. 
Since no claim was filed with the governing body as required by the Statute and Case 
Law within that one-year period, the Claim is barred and this Court is without jurisdiction. 
Further, given the tenor of Plaintiff s letter to Mr. Storey on November 16, 1995, it 
was clear that Plaintiffs counsel was aware that the Claim was not settled and that Defendant 
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City's insurance company was refusing to settle. Given these facts, the Court finds that there 
is no grounds for Plaintiffs claim of equitable estoppel or waiver of the notice requirements. 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Defendant's counsel is to prepare Findings and Judgment in accordance with the 
Court's Ruling and submit the same to Plaintiffs counsel at least five days prior to the time it 
is submitted to the Court for signature. 
Dated this jMV^day of April, 1998. 
By the Court: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I , the undersigned, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S 
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mr. William R. Hadley 
2225 East Murray-Holladay Road, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Mr. Harry H. Souvall 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. O. Box 4500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Mr. Kenneth L. Sondgeroth 
5525 Highway 95, Suite 7 
Bullhead City, AZ 86426 
Dated this J ) / day of April, 1998. ^ 
Clerk/ Deputy/ Clerk 
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HARRY H. SOUVALL (A4919) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Kaysville City Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
FiLEDIN CLERK'S 0F?iC£ 
DAVIS CQ'JM:-, MTAh 
JUH 2 8 u AH'98 
CLEFS,::-.'. : r.COURT 
0 nv 
:< 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
JOANNA BANFORD, and AMBER 
B ANFORD, a minor, by and through her 
parent and natural guardian, Joanna Banford, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID QUDSfLEY, an individual and 
KAYSVILLE CITY, CORP., a Utah 
political subdivision, and, KAYSVILLE 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 970700076 PI 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled 
Court. Plaintiffs were represented by William R. Hadley and Defendants were represented by 
Harry H. Souvall. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda and having heard arguments 
of counsel, and having reconsidered and granted Defendants' Motion to Alter Findings and 
Amend Judgment; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
Plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed for failure to file a Notice of Claim with Defendants 
as mandated by Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-13 (1953, as amended). 
DATED this j ^ d a y of May, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
HADLEY AND HADLEY, L.C. 
Honorable Rodjjtey S. Page 
District Court Judge 
cm *V 
William R Hadley, Esq .^X^ 
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